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In re Anderson and the Removal of Utah State Court 
Judges: The Supreme Court of Utah and its Review of 
Judicial Conduct Commission Orders 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Since becoming a state in 1896, only one Utah state court judge has 
been removed from the bench by any branch of the government,1 Third 
District Juvenile Court Judge Joseph W. Anderson.2 Appointed by 
Governor Michael O. Leavitt in 1995,3 Anderson received a 79% “Yes”4 
retention vote from the public,5 and an average favorability rating from 
attorneys of 91.7%6 in the 1998 election. Yet less than six years later, on 
January 23, 2004, Anderson’s impressive career, which included a U.S. 
District Court clerkship,7 sixteen years as Assistant United States 
 1. See In re Worthen 926 P.2d 853, 857-58 (Utah 1990); Elizabeth Neff, Judge Fired from 
Bench: Supreme Court Cites ‘Tragic Personal Decisions’ in a First for Utah; Judge is Removed 
from Bench, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 24, 2004, at B1. 
 2. See In re Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2004). When the Utah Supreme Court removed 
Judge Joseph W. Anderson from the bench on January 23, 2004 the order read, “we . . . order that 
Judge Joseph W. Anderson be, and hereby is, removed from his office as a juvenile court judge, 
effective immediately.” Id. at 1153.  Joseph W. Anderson graduated from the University of Utah 
College of Law in 1974. After clerking for a year for a Federal Circuit Judge in the Northern District 
of West Virginia, he spent three years as an associate with the Salt Lake City, Utah firm of Parsons, 
Behle, & Latimer. In 1979 he became an Assistant U.S. Attorney (“AUSA”) and spent three years in 
the Northern District of West Virginia before transferring to the District of Utah in 1982 where he 
worked as an AUSA until his nomination to the bench in 1995. See 3rd District District and Juvenile 
Courts, at http://governor.state.ut.us/lt_gover/vip3district.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2005). 
 3. Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1141. He was nominated by Governor Michael O. Leavitt. Brief of 
Appellant at 8-9, In re Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2004) (No. 20030345-SC). 
 4. Stephen Hunt, Judge Voluntarily Removes Himself From Child Welfare Cases, SALT 
LAKE TRIB., Nov. 16, 2000, at B2; see also 1998 General for Judicial Retention Elections, available 
at http://governor.state.ut.us/lt_gover/98GenJudView.htm (79% was a percentage comparable to his 
colleagues) (last visited Feb. 16, 2005); In re Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1141-42; Brief of Appellant at 8-
9, In re Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2004) (No. 20030345-SC). 
 5. UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 9. State judges in Utah are subject to retention elections: 
Each appointee to a court of record shall be subject to an unopposed retention election at 
the first general election held more than three years after appointment. Following initial 
voter approval . . . each judge of other courts of record every sixth year, shall be subject 
to an unopposed retention election at the corresponding general election. 
 Id. 
 6. 3rd District District and Juvenile Courts, at http://governor.state.ut.us/lt_gover/vip3distri 
ct.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2005). The favorability ratings are established in thirteen different 
questions of judicial competency and this average was reached by simply taking the sum of all 
thirteen percentages and then dividing it by thirteen. The “standard favorable response” is 70%, 
though the vast majority of judges scored well above the 70% level. Id. 
 7. Anderson clerked in the Northern District of West Virginia. See 3rd District and Juvenile 
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Attorney,8 and eight years as a juvenile court judge, came to an abrupt 
halt when the Utah Supreme Court (“supreme court”) removed him from 
the bench.9
The supreme court does have the power to remove a judge from the 
bench, but their decision to do so in Anderson extended beyond the scope 
of both precedent and their constitutionally-granted powers10 pertaining 
to orders from Judicial Conduct Commission (“JCC”) orders.11 Prior to 
In re Anderson, only three judicial discipline cases had reached the 
state’s supreme court,12 and these cases delineated a conservative 
precedent when reviewing JCC proceedings and recommendations.13 
More pointedly, the Utah Constitution states that the court’s function is 
limited to reviewing the body of the proceedings and complaints before 
the JCC,14 yet the court removed Judge Anderson for conduct never 
considered by the JCC. This paper therefore concludes that the court 
should have followed precedent and constitutionally-prescribed 
procedure by limiting its review to the complaints dealt with by the JCC. 
Also, the supreme court has now set a precedent that bypasses a 
constitutional body, and takes matters into its own hands. In slippery-
slope fashion, one wonders under what circumstances the supreme court 
will feel are unique enough or severe enough to repeat this outcome and 
whether the supreme court could extend its reasoning into its review of 
government agencies and their judicial proceedings. In short, the possible 
repercussions of this decision extending to other realms or even to other 
judicial discipline cases, could subsume due process as intended by both 
the state’s legislature and its constitution. 
 
A.  A Brief Overview of the Case 
 
The Guardian ad Litem’s (“GAL”) office filed the initial complaint 
with the state’s JCC, stating that Judge Anderson was not complying 
Courts, at http://governor.state.ut.us/lt_gover/vip3district.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2005). 
 8. Three years were in the Northern District of West Virginia and approximately thirteen 
were in the District of Utah where he spent nine years as the Civil Division chief. See id. 
 9. Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1134. 
 10. UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 13; see also Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1134. 
 11. It should be noted that of the three methods provided in Utah for the removal of a judge, 
only one is open to the judiciary. See infra Section II: “Removal of State Judges in Utah.” That 
method permits removal based on the court’s review capacity of the Utah Judicial Conduct 
Commission’s (hereinafter “JCC”) recommendations and was the method employed by the court in 
removing Judge Anderson from the bench. See Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2004). 
 12. In re Young, 976 P.2d 581 (Utah 1999); In re McCully, 942 P.2d 327 (Utah 1997); In re 
Worthen, 926 P.2d 853 (Utah 1996). 
 13. See infra pp. 6-7. 
 14. UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 13. 
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with the state’s statutory deadlines pertaining to child welfare cases.15 
Despite various attempts to remedy the situation, the timeliness problems 
remained and the JCC began official proceedings.16 During the JCC 
investigation, however, Anderson disqualified himself from hearing the 
majority of his cases because they involved either the GAL’s office or 
the Attorney General’s office, a party that had also become involved in 
the proceedings.17 Anderson also minimized the cases he could 
objectively hear by filing a civil complaint in federal court against the 
JCC and GAL as well as their directors alleging various rights violations 
under the U.S. and the Utah Constitutions.18 He further alleged that the 
directors of both GAL and the JCC were conspiring to have him removed 
from the bench.19 The complaints before the JCC, however, pertained 
only to the timeliness issues and the JCC accordingly recommended to 
the supreme court that Anderson be publicly reprimanded.20
Upon receiving the case, the supreme court did something they had 
never done when dealing with judicial discipline; they appointed a 
special master21 to gather additional evidence.22 The information 
requested by the court, however, pertained almost exclusively to the 
federal suit and Anderson’s actions subsequent to the complaints filed 
with the JCC.23 The court’s requests are problematic because precedent24 
and the Utah Constitution25 strongly suggest that all complaints must first 
be addressed to the JCC, after which the supreme court is to review the 
proceedings. Thus, collecting evidence pertaining to matters beyond the 
scope of the complaints filed with the JCC exceeds the scope of the 
 15. Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1142. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 1141-42. The Attorney General’s office got involved because they often appeared 
before Judge Anderson and gave statements to the JCC concerning Anderson’s performance. Id. at 
1142. 
 18. Id. at 1143. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 1138. 
 21. A master is:  
[a] parajudicial officer . . . specially appointed to help a court with its proceedings. A 
master may take testimony, hear and rule on discovery disputes and other pre-trial 
matters, compute interest, value annuities, investigate encumbrances on land titles, and 
the like—usu. with a written report to the court. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 989-90 (7th ed. 1999). A special master is “[a] master appointed to 
assist the court with a particular matter or case.” Id. 
 22. Fourth District Judge Anthony W. Schofield was appointed as special master by the 
supreme court. Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1140. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See In re Young, 976 P.2d 581 (Utah 1999); In re McCully, 942 P.2d 327 (Utah 1997); In 
re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853 (Utah 1996). 
 25. See UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 13. 
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court’s review capacity.26 Furthermore, the court’s reliance upon the 
special master’s findings in removing Judge Anderson, placed his 
removal beyond the scope of the court’s constitutionally-prescribed 
powers.27
 
II.  REMOVAL OF STATE JUDGES IN UTAH28
 
Utah currently has three alternative methods for removing state 
judges from the bench. The first, as laid out in article VIII, section 9 of 
the Utah Constitution, states that “every sixth year” state judges “shall be 
subject to an unopposed retention election at the corresponding general 
election.”29 This empowers the state’s citizens to remove a judge if they 
are able to muster a majority vote against a specific judge during a 
retention election.30 This method has been in place since 1985, but was 
not successfully employed to remove a judge until Judge David S. Young 
lost his retention election by a 53% to 47% vote in 2002.31
A Utah state judge can also be removed by the state’s legislative 
branch. Under this method a judge can only be removed by a two-thirds 
vote from the House of Representatives and a trial, followed by a two-
thirds vote in the Senate.32 Such an action can only arise when a judge is 
impeached for “high crimes, misdemeanors, or malfeasance in office”33 
and has never been employed in Utah.34
The final removal method makes use of the state’s JCC as well as the 
 26. See infra pp. 15-20. While the court explicitly refutes this argument, this Note argues that 
it did so unsuccessfully. See Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1148. 
 27. It is important to point out a distinction: This Note does not argue that Judge Anderson 
should never have been removed from the bench; rather it focuses on the improper procedures of the 
court in doing so. 
 28. For a more complete discussion of the history and progression of judicial discipline in 
Utah, see Worthen, 926 P.2d at 857-59, and Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1138-40. 
 29. UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 9. 
 30. Elizabeth Neff, Voters Oust Young, Making Him 1st State Judge Removed on a Retention 
Ballot, SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 6, 2002, at A15. 
 31. Elizabeth Neff, Judge’s Removal Causes Stir, SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 7, 2002, at B1. 
Judge Young had gained a reputation for being soft on sexual offenders. In one instance, a 
newspaper reported: 
The effort to remove the judge has been in the works since he ordered two 21-year-old 
men to perform 150 hours community service hours for sex acts with a 12-year-old girl. 
Prosecutors in Tooele had charged the men with sodomy, a first-degree felony. Young 
reduced those charges to third-degree felonies and did not order any jail time. The men 
said they thought the girl was 17. 
Laura Hancock, Group Steps up Efforts to Remove Judge Young, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City), 
Oct. 12, 2002, at B6. It should also be noted that Judge Young was almost successfully removed 
from the bench in 1996–being retained by a very slim 51% to 49% vote. Id. 
 32. Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1138-39. 
 33. UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 19. 
 34. See In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 857 (Utah 1996). 
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state supreme court.35 This removal process is slightly more complex 
than the other two methods of removal because it involves the state 
constitution, judicial precedent, the JCC’s bylaws, and the review 
capacities of the supreme court. Article VIII, section 13 of the Utah 
Constitution established the JCC and reads as follows: 
 
A Judicial Conduct Commission is established which shall investigate 
and conduct confidential hearings regarding complaints against any 
justice or judge. Following its investigations and hearings, the Judicial 
Conduct Commission may order the reprimand, censure, suspension, 
removal, or involuntary retirement of any justice or judge for the 
following: 
(1) action which constitutes willful misconduct in office; 
(2) final conviction of a crime punishable as a felony under state or 
federal law; 
(3) willful and persistent failure to perform judicial duties; 
(4) disability that seriously interferes with the performance of 
judicial duties; or 
(5) conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which 
brings a judicial office into disrepute. 
Prior to the implementation of any commission order, the Supreme 
Court shall review the commission’s proceedings as to both law and 
fact. The court may also permit the introduction of additional evidence. 
After its review, the Supreme Court shall, as it finds just and proper, 
issue its order implementing, rejecting, or modifying the commission’s 
order.36
 
Judge Joseph W. Anderson was the first, and at the publication of this 
Note, the only judge to be removed from office under the auspices of this 
constitutional provision.37 The supreme court exceeded this 
constitutionally prescribed method of judicial discipline in the manner in 
which it removed Judge Anderson from the bench. 
This Note will illustrate this by: first, analyzing the precedent in 
Utah pertaining to judicial discipline cases and showing that the supreme 
court exceeded the bounds they had placed on themselves pertaining to 
 35. UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 13. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Though because the first two methods are fairly narrow in their reach, this is the method 
employed on a regular basis to levy less stringent forms of discipline and the JCC regularly 
investigates dozens of complaints. See Elizabeth Neff, Discipline Records Opened, SALT LAKE 
TRIB., Jan. 2, 2003, at B1 (“Utah’s Conduct Commission dismisses 82 percent of all complaints . . . . 
Between fiscal years 1996 and 2002, judges were privately sanctioned in 34 cases, while public 
sanctions were issued in 14 cases.”). 
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their review capacity of JCC recommendations; second, discussing the 
proceedings of the principle case, the hearings, investigations and orders 
of the JCC, the special master’s task and report, and the supreme court’s 
reasoning; third, discussing the referral to the special master and that the 
information the court requested from the special master lay beyond the 
realm of the supreme court’s powers as laid out in both precedent and the 
Utah Constitution; fourth, expanding upon the dissent in stating that the 
supreme court’s review was unconstitutional because they considered 
actions and issues that were never before the JCC; and fifth, stating how 
the court’s action should have occurred in order to be constitutional. 
 
III.  JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE PRECEDENT IN UTAH 
 
Prior to Judge Anderson’s case, the supreme court had rendered but 
three opinions in its review capacity of a JCC recommendation 
pertaining to judicial discipline.38 Consequently the language of the Utah 
Constitution is the principle source in defining the relationship between 
the court and the JCC, stating that a JCC order must be reviewed by the 
supreme court before it is implemented.39
The Utah Constitution, however, does not specify how the court is to 
proceed in its review of a JCC order. For instance, how much deference 
should the court give to the JCC’s findings of fact and conclusions of 
law? To what extent and for what purpose can or should the court 
“permit the introduction of additional evidence”?40 Just how broad is the 
supreme court’s review? Supreme court precedent holds answers to these 
questions and an examination of that precedent is vital to grasping this 
Note’s argument that the supreme court’s review in Anderson exceeded 
the scope of its authority. 
 
A.  The Three Defining Cases 
 
The supreme court’s first opinion pertaining to its JCC review 
capacity came in the joined cases of two Justice Court Judges—Richard 
Worthen and Gaylen Buckley.41 The JCC’s investigation of Judge 
 38. In re Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2004). The three cases are: In re Young, 976 P.2d 
581 (Utah 1999); In re McCully, 942 P.2d 327 (Utah 1997); In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853 (Utah 
1996). There is another case of great significance to this area, In re Greenwood, 796 P.2d 682 (Utah 
1990), that also describes the role of the supreme court pertaining to its review of JCC orders. The 
JCC was created in 1984. Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1138-39. 
 39. UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 13; see Worthen, 926 P.2d at 862 (“the Commission’s order has 
no effect whatsoever unless it is first reviewed by [the supreme court] and this court determines to 
enforce it” (emphasis added)). 
 40. UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 13. 
 41. Worthen, 926 P.2d at 856. The court’s rulings pertaining to both judges were joined into 
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Worthen considered his late reporting of DUI convictions to the Driver’s 
License Division,42 whereas Judge Buckley was investigated for not 
following proper warrant procedures and for exceeding his authority in 
handing out an excessive contempt conviction.43 The JCC ordered a 
sanction of public censure44 for each judge due to “willful misconduct in 
office and for conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice,”45 and 
also ordered that Judge Worthen be suspended for ninety days.46
In its review, the supreme court reaffirmed itself as the ultimate 
arbiter of judicial discipline in Utah,47 yet set a conservative precedent by 
choosing to forego the chance to gather further evidence, claiming it had 
no ready means to do so.48 It also did not want to demean the role of the 
constitutionally created Judicial Conduct Commission,49 so it remanded 
the proceedings back to the JCC for that body to collect enough 
information for the court to make a determination.50
 The following year, 1997, the supreme court heard Juvenile Court 
Judge Sharon McCully’s appeal from a JCC order that she be publicly 
reprimanded.51 The JCC’s order stemmed from Judge McCully’s 
submission of an affidavit describing the role of the Guardian ad Litem’s 
office in juvenile court.52 The JCC found that McCully’s conduct was 
 
prejudicial to the administration of justice which brought a judicial 
office into disrepute in violation of section 78-7-28(1)(e) of the Utah 
Code because she prepared and allowed a litigant to submit an affidavit 
containing not only facts regarding the operation of the juvenile courts, 
but also her opinion as to the ultimate issue before the court in which 
her affidavit was submitted.53
 
this one opinion. Id. 
 42. Id. at 861. 
 43. Id. at 860. 
 44. Id. at 860, 862. 
 45. Id. at 856; see also UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 13(3) (stating the Judicial Conduct 
Commission can sanction a judge for “(1) action which constitutes willful misconduct in office” or 
“(5) conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings a judicial office into 
disrepute”). 
 46. Worthen, 926 P.2d at 862. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 864. 
 49. Id. at 865. 
 50. Id. at 872 (explaining that because the JCC’s findings lack specificity dealing with certain 
areas of the judge’s misconduct “we [the court] find it impossible to perform our constitutional and 
statutory review function on the . . . records before us”). 
 51. In re McCully, 942 P.2d 327 (Utah 1997). 
 52. Id. at 328-30. 
 53. Id. at 333. 
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The supreme court reviewed each finding and the associated proceedings 
in turn,54 dismissed McCully’s subsequent claims,55 and ultimately 
implemented the JCC’s order.56
The most recent case prior to Anderson involved another Third 
District Judge, David S. Young.57 The JCC received a complaint alleging 
Judge Young made an ex parte phone call to counsel in one of Young’s 
active cases.58 The JCC found that Judge Young had violated the Judicial 
Code of Conduct and recommended a public reprimand as the 
appropriate sanction.59 The case was then referred to the supreme court 
for review.60
After examining the evidence, the supreme court concluded that the 
JCC’s factual findings were “not arbitrary, capricious, or plainly in error, 
but [were] sufficiently supported by the record evidence.”61 As a result, 
the supreme court “conclude[d] that Judge Young’s misconduct 
warrant[ed] the sanction of public reprimand.”62
 
IV.  THE PRINCIPAL CASE: IN RE ANDERSON63
 
The actions that led to Anderson’s ultimate removal occurred 
between the years 1999 and 2000.64 Utah law mandates that a juvenile 
court judge hold an adjudicative hearing “no later than 60 calendar days 
from the date of the shelter hearing” when dealing with certain forms of 
child welfare cases.65 Secondly, a trial court judge “shall decide all 
matters submitted for final determination within two months of 
submission, unless circumstances causing the delay are beyond the 
judge’s control.”66
 54. Id. at 330-31. 
 55. Id. at 332-34. 
 56. Id. at 333-34; see also Sheila R. McCann, Utah’s High Court Slaps Judge With 
Reprimand, SALT LAKE TRIB., July 9, 1997, at B3. Despite the reprimand, Judge McCully has had a 
distinguished career. She has twice been named the Utah State Bar’s juvenile court judge of the year 
(1988, 2001) and in July 2004, she was named as the sixtieth president of the National Council of 
Juvenile and Family Court Judges for the 2004-05 term. Utah Judge Named to Lead U.S. Group, 
DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City, Metro ed.), July 28, 2004, at B2. 
 57. In re Young, 984 P.2d 997 (Utah 1999). 
 58. Id. at 998-99. 
 59. Id. at 1000. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 1004. 
 62. Id. at 1009. Judge Young has since lost a retention election. See supra p. 4. 
 63. In re Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2004). 
 64. Id. at 1142. 
 65. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-308(2) (2004). The specific types of child welfare cases are 
those dealing with abuse, neglect, and dependency. Id. 
 66. Id. at § 78-7-25(1). In the case before the Utah Supreme Court, Judge Anderson disputed 
the constitutional authority of the legislature to set such deadlines. Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1141. His 
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Judge Anderson’s apparent lack of timeliness pertaining to these two 
statutes created a stir amongst litigants who appeared before him—most 
particularly the Guardian ad Litem’s and Attorney General’s offices. 67 
These offices worried that in cases dealing with abuse and neglect, any 
unnecessary delay could be damaging to the children who were in limbo 
throughout the court proceedings.68 The two offices worked together in 
an unsuccessful effort to resolve the delays in Judge Anderson’s 
courtroom69 and they may have been more successful if Anderson had 
been willing to admit that he was the root of the problem. Instead, he 
abdicated all responsibility for the delays.70 Anderson even remained 
immovable in the face of a compliance order from the Utah Court of 
Appeals.71
Accordingly, Kristin Brewer, in her position as Director of the 
Guardian ad Litem’s office, filed a formal compliant with the JCC on 
June 27, 2000.72 The complaint dealt specifically with Judge Anderson’s 
inability to comply with the statutory deadlines in child welfare cases.73 
On the same day, Laura Beck, on behalf of the Attorney General’s office, 
filed a similar complaint with the JCC.74 Shortly thereafter the JCC 
claim relied on the separation of powers doctrine by stating that laws which set deadlines and 
scheduling for judges “are unconstitutional intrusions of the legislature into the core functions of the 
judiciary.” Brief of Appellant at 30, In re Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2004) (No. 20030345-SC). 
In response, the Attorney General’s office extensively addressed the constitutionality of the two 
statutes in its second brief to the Utah Supreme Court. Brief of Utah Attorney General Mark L. 
Shurtleff at 2, 3-8, In re Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2004) (No. 20030345-SC). The Attorney 
General’s brief contended that the “statutes do not interfere with the core judicial function of 
deciding cases and because they do not impermissively exert the power of the legislative branch over 
the judiciary, they do not violate the separation of powers provision.” Id. at 8. Interestingly, the 
supreme court stated that Judge Anderson’s claims may have some merit, but dismissed the claim 
because he did “not argue that his constitutional objection to the statutory deadlines was the reason 
he failed to observe those deadlines.” Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1149. Thus, because Anderson did not 
raise his objection “contemporaneous with his refusal to observe the statutory requirements” the 
supreme court had “no reason to believe that constitutional principle motivated that refusal” to 
follow the statutes. Id at 1149. 
 67. See Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1142. From “1999-2000, Judge Anderson had significant 
difficulty managing his child welfare cases in compliance with statutory deadlines for hearings and 
action.” Id.; see also Stephen Hunt, Judge Voluntarily Removes Himself From Child Welfare Cases, 
SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 16, 2000, at B2. 
 68. 1998 General for Judicial Retention Elections, available at http://governor.state.ut.us/lt_ 
gover/98GenJudView.htm; Stephen Hunt, Judge Voluntarily Removes Himself From Child Welfare 
Cases, SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 16, 2000, at B2. 
 69. Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1141-42. 
 70. Id. at 1142. 
 71. Office of Guardian ad Litem v. Anderson, 987 P.2d 611 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). The 
supreme court references multiple orders from the court of appeals. Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1142. 
 72. Brief of Appellant at 9, In re Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2004) (No. 20030345-SC); 
Initial Brief of Utah Judicial Conduct Commission at 3, In re Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2004) 
(No. 20030345-SC). 
 73. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-308(2) (2004); Id. at § 78-7-25(1); Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1142. 
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consolidated the two complaints and treated them as one throughout its 
investigation and review.75
 
A.  JCC Proceedings 
 
The JCC began its formal proceedings against Judge Anderson on 
December 8, 2000, and throughout the course of its investigation 
addressed seventy-six claims of misconduct.76 Only a month earlier, 
Judge Anderson had “voluntarily removed himself from hearing child 
welfare cases and began hearing only juvenile delinquency cases,”77 
thereby eliminating about 70 percent of his caseload.78 This left his 
colleagues in the Third District with a significantly heavier caseload.79 
Yet the biggest complications during the proceedings stemmed from 
Anderson’s own actions. 
Judge Anderson filed a federal civil complaint in the Federal District 
of Utah on December 5, 2001.80 In that complaint he named Steven 
Stewart, the Executive Director of the JCC, Dane Noland, the Chairman 
of the JCC, and Kristin Brewer, in her capacity as the Director of the 
Guardian ad Litem office, as defendants.81
Anderson’s suit made numerous claims, the first of which was that 
the JCC is unconstitutional because there is no separation of functions—
meaning that the JCC acts as the investigator, prosecutor, and judge in all 
cases that come before it.82 He also claimed that the Office of the 
 74. Initial Brief of Utah Judicial Conduct Commission at 3, In re Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134 
(Utah 2004) (No. 20030345-SC). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Brief of Appellant at 9, In re Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2004) (No. 20030345-SC). 
 77. Stephen Hunt & Ashley Estes Broughton, Judge Tries to Turn Tables on Judicial 
Conduct Board, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 11, 2001, at A1; Stephen Hunt, Judge’s Battle May Head to 
Supreme Court, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 5, 2002, at B2 (quote is the same in both accounts). 
 78. Stephen Hunt & Ashley Estes Broughton, Judge Tries to Turn Tables on Judicial 
Conduct Board, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 11, 2001, at A1. 
 79. In re Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134, 1142-43 (Utah 2004); Stephen Hunt, Judge Voluntarily 
Removes Himself From Child Welfare Cases, SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 16, 2000, at B2. 
 80. Brief of Appellant at 11, In re Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2004) (No. 20030345-SC). 
“The suit was filed in federal court because it challenges the constitutionality of the 10-member 
Judicial Conduct Commission, which includes state representatives, state senators, Utah State Bar 
members and a state judge.” Stephen Hunt & Ashley Estes Broughton, Judge Tries to Turn Tables 
on Judicial Conduct Board, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 11, 2001, at A1. Thus, Anderson filed in a 
forum where the potential for bias and or outside influence was minimal. 
 81. Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1143; Brief of Appellant at 11, In re Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134 (Utah 
2004) (No. 20030345-SC). 
 82. Angie Welling, Juvenile Court Judge Sues Judicial Conduct Panel, DESERET NEWS (Salt 
Lake City), Dec. 11, 2001, at B4. Stephen Hunt & Ashley Estes Broughton, Judge Tries to Turn 
Tables on Judicial Conduct Board, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 11, 2001, at A1; see also Brief of 
Appellant at 35-36, In re Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2004) (No. 20030345-SC). This topic could 
be its own note because Anderson also made this claim before the supreme court. See Brief of Utah 
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Guardian ad Litem “was deficient in a number of important respects” in 
its “representation of children.”83 Furthermore, Anderson alleged that the 
complaint filed with the JCC was reviving a resolved issue and was 
meant to “deprive Judge Anderson of both his position on the bench and 
his constitutionally protected rights in the process.”84
In his First Amended Complaint filed on December 20, 2001, 
Anderson sought monetary damages by naming Kristin Brewer and 
Steven Stewart personally as defendants.85 He claimed that Brewer’s 
JCC complaint made false comments about him to his public detriment, 
and that the complaint constituted retaliation for the frustration she feels 
at Judge Anderson’s lack of timeliness in child welfare cases.86
The animosity between Judge Anderson and the GAL and AG’s 
offices only intensified when, in the late summer of 2002, they87 filed 
motions to disqualify Judge Anderson from hearing “any matter 
involving representation by the Office of the Guardian ad Litem . . . for 
reason of expressed bias against the attorneys of that office, including the 
director.”88 In each case the trial court denied the motion, and in each 
case the ruling was appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals.89 As to the 
Guardian ad Litem’s motion, the appellate court ruled that Anderson 
should be disqualified “in any pending or future cases in which an 
attorney employed by the Office of the Guardian ad Litem appears.”90 
The court of appeals likewise accepted the Attorney General’s motion 
and disqualified Anderson from “all cases in which the Attorney 
General’s office appeared or would appear in the future.”91 Naturally this 
resulted in Judge Anderson’s already-minimal caseload92 becoming even 
more restricted.93
Attorney General Mark L. Shurtleff at 2, 3-8, In re Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2004) (No. 
20030345-SC). Interestingly, however, the supreme court dismissed the claim, upholding both the 
composition and the tasks of the JCC seeing “no constitutional infirmity with this process.” 
Anderson, 82 P.33 at 1147. 
 83. Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1143. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 1143; see also Brief of Appellant at 12, In re Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2004) 
(No. 20030345-SC). 
 86. Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1142-43. Ironically, the supreme court’s ruling called Judge 
Anderson’s federal lawsuit, “retaliation”, the very charge he laid at the feet of Kristin Brewer. Id. at 
1141, 1152. 
 87. The AG’s office filed on behalf of the Department of Child and Family Services 
(“DCFS”). 
 88. Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1143. 
 89. Id. at 1143-44. 
 90. Brief of Appellant at 12, In re Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2004) (No. 20030345-SC). 
 91. Id. at 13. 
 92. Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1142-43. 
 93. It is significant to note, however, that Judge Anderson was in the process of trying to get 
the Court of Appeals’ decisions reversed. State Dep’t of Human Services, Div. of Child and Family 
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1.  JCC hearings 
 
Following these events, the JCC held two confidential hearings—the 
first on November 12, 2002, and the second on March 11, 2003.94 
Anderson testified at each and submitted numerous documents 
supporting his defense, and attorneys from each side argued their clients’ 
cases before the Commission.95 Following these proceedings, the JCC 
released its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on March 27, 
2003.96 Although the JCC dismissed the majority of the claims against 
Judge Anderson,97 it found that Anderson had violated Utah Code § 78-
3a-308(2) by failing to hold adjudication hearings “within 60 days of the 
related shelter hearings” in nine separate instances.98 They also found 
that Anderson violated Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-25(1) on two occasions, 
meaning that Anderson did not “decide all matters submitted for final 
determination within two months of submission” in two cases.99
The JCC concluded that Anderson’s wayward actions “constitute[d] 
a pattern of disregard and indifference to the law,” “violated Code of 
Judicial Conduct Canon 2A, which requires judges to ‘respect and 
Services v. Oddone, 84 P.3d 1170 (Utah 2004). In this case, the Third District Juvenile Court’s 
Presiding Judge, Frederic Oddone, appealed the Court of Appeals’ decisions that disqualified Judge 
Anderson from cases dealing with the Attorney General or the Guardian ad Litem’s offices. He 
appealed because Anderson’s disqualification had a serious impact on the Third Juvenile District 
and, as the judge in charge of coordinating the district’s schedules, Oddone sought a removal of the 
severe restrictions placed upon one of his judges. Id. at 1170. The Utah Supreme Court decided the 
case at the same time as In re Anderson, making the case a moot issue. Id. Yet the court did state that 
the indeterminate time period put forward by the Court of Appeals was inappropriate. But the court 
also agreed that the disqualification was appropriate for the time it was in place. Id. The significance 
lies in the fact that the supreme court could have removed the disqualification on Judge Anderson 
and he could have begun hearing cases once again. 
 94. Initial Brief of Utah Judicial Conduct Commission at Addendum 2, 1, In re Anderson, 82 
P.3d 1134 (Utah 2004) (No. 20030345-SC) (Addendum 2 is the Judicial Conduct Commission’s 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law). 
 95. Id. at 1-3. 
 96. Id. at 9. 
 97. The Commission dismissed the claims for several reasons. One was because “the 
Examiner failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the matter was under advisement 
for more than two months.” Id. at 8; see also id. at 6 (“insufficient evidence to find that the 
adjudication hearings were held more than 60 days beyond the shelter hearings”). The Commission 
also found that the exception provision in Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-25(1), which permits delays if 
they are caused by circumstances beyond the judge’s control, was applicable to many of the delays 
at issue. Id. at 8. Mr. Colin Winchester, Executive Director for the JCC, also moved to dismiss a 
number of claims at the outset of the hearings. Id. at 2. Following the dismissals, eleven of the 
original seventy-six claims remained. 
 98. Id. at 5-6, findings 7-15. Shelter hearings are defined as “A hearing shortly after the 
state’s removal of a child for suspected abuse or neglect. . . . The purpose of the hearing is to 
determine whether the state has adequate cause to maintain the children in protective care.” BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (Found on WESTLAW under “hearing”). 
 99. Initial Brief of Utah Judicial Conduct Commission at Addendum 2, 7-9, In re Anderson, 
82 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2004) (No. 20030345-SC). 
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comply with the law’,” and “committed conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice which brings a judicial office into disrepute.”100 
Accordingly, the JCC released its Formal Order of Reprimand, stating, 
“[a] majority of Commissioners . . . concluded that a formal (public) 
order of reprimand is an appropriate sanction, and therefore orders the 
same.” 101 At the end of the Formal Order of Reprimand, the JCC stated, 
in accordance with the Utah Constitution,102 “[t]his order shall only take 
effect upon implementation of the same by the Utah Supreme Court.”103
 
B.  The Special Master 
 
Upon receiving the case, the supreme court appointed a special 
master, Fourth District Judge Anthony W. Schofield, to review and 
gather more evidence.104 The court tasked the special master with six 
specific areas of inquiry: (1) the impact of “any dispute between Judge 
Anderson and the Office of the Guardian ad Litem” on current relations 
between the two;105 (2) whether any “conflicts in the past or present 
between Judge Anderson and any litigants or representatives of litigants, 
or the Office of the Guardian ad Litem” have impacted Anderson’s 
ability to carry a typical caseload;106 (3) whether anything related to the 
conduct investigated by the JCC has impacted Judge Anderson’s job 
performance,107 his colleagues,108 the “scheduling and assignment of 
cases in the Third District Juvenile Court,”109 and the “frequency and 
result of requests for Judge Anderson to recuse himself” appertaining to 
 100. Id. at 9. 
 101. Initial Brief of Utah Judicial Conduct Commission at Addendum 1, 1, In re Anderson, 82 
P.3d 1134 (Utah 2004) (No. 20030345-SC) (Addendum 1 is the Judicial Conduct Commission’s 
Formal Order of Reprimand p.1. Dated March 27, 2003). 
 102. UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 13. 
 103. Initial Brief of Utah Judicial Conduct Commission at Addendum 1, 1, In re Anderson, 82 
P.3d 1134 (Utah 2004) (No. 20030345-SC). 
 104. Id. at Addendum 3, 1 (Addendum 3 is the Supreme Court’s Order of Referral to the 
Special Master). Judge Anderson filed an objection to the referral and claimed that the supreme court 
had no authority to appoint a special master and that the special master was inappropriately tasked 
with discovering issues that were not part of the JCC complaint. Brief of Appellant at 51-52, In re 
Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2004) (No. 20030345-SC) (This argument will be discussed at length 
later in this Note). The court rejected Anderson’s argument by stating that “[h]ow . . . evidence is to 
be introduced is left to [the court’s] discretion” and “the appointment of a master is a traditional and 
time-honored mechanism” for gathering evidence. In re Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134, 1148 (Utah 2004). 
 105. Initial Brief of Utah Judicial Conduct Commission at Addendum 3, 3 part (C)(1), In re 
Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2004) (No. 20030345-SC). 
 106. Id. at 3 part (C)(2). 
 107. Id. at 3 part (C)(3)(A). 
 108. Id. at 3 part (C)(3)(B). 
 109. Id. at 3 part (C)(3)(C). 
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matters that are a “usual part of his assigned caseload”;110 (4) what effect 
of any “litigation in any court” pertaining to Judge Anderson, and any 
“directives from higher courts regarding [such] matters”; (5) whether 
“Judge Anderson has been rendered unable to perform the duties of his 
office”;111 (6) all other matters that will “present a full and accurate 
exposition of” issues 1-5.112
Following seven days of evidentiary hearings, the special master 
filed his findings with the supreme court on October 3, 2003.113
 
C.  The Utah Supreme Court’s Decision 
 
The supreme court decided, in pertinent part, that Judge Anderson’s 
actions, particularly those subsequent to the events reviewed by the JCC, 
were of such a nature that Anderson should be removed immediately 
from office.114 The court stated that Anderson’s case raised “unique 
complications”,115 which is why they appointed a special master to 
collect copious evidence surrounding Anderson’s conduct and the effects 
thereof, subsequent to the issues dealt with by the JCC.116 The court’s 
final decision was two-fold. First, it concluded that Judge Anderson’s 
lack of timeliness pertaining to child custody hearings “constituted a 
pattern of disregard and indifference to the law”117 that led to “conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings a judicial office 
into disrepute.”118 Second, and “[m]ore importantly . . . based upon the 
facts and evidence adduced by the proceedings before the special 
master,”119 Judge Anderson’s conduct likewise “constitutes conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings a judicial office 
into disrepute.”120 The court then increased the JCC’s sanction 
recommendation to “order that Judge Joseph Anderson be . . . removed 
from his office . . . effective immediately.”121
 
 110. Id. at 3 part (C)(3)(D). 
 111. Id. at 3 part (C)(5). 
 112. Id. at 3 part (C)(6). 
 113. Initial Brief of Utah Judicial Conduct Commission at 4, In re Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134 
(Utah 2004) (No. 20030345-SC). 
 114. In re Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134, 1138 (Utah 2004). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id.; accord Initial Brief of Utah Judicial Conduct Commission at Addendum 3, 3 part (C), 
In re Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2004) (No. 20030345-SC). 
 117. Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1153. 
 118. Id.; UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 13(5). 
 119. Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1153. 
 120. Id.; UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 13(5). 
 121. Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1153. 
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V.  ARGUMENT 
 
The supreme court’s removal of Juvenile Court Judge Joseph 
Anderson was both divergent from precedent and unconstitutional. State 
precedent in judicial discipline cases points to a deferential standard 
wherein the court has chosen not to engage in significant fact-finding. 
The court, however, took a new path in appointing a special master, and 
did so in a manner that surpassed the court’s review-capacity under the 
constitution. Additionally, precedent restrains itself to a proper review of 
the JCC’s proceedings. The Anderson court sidelines both precedent and 
the JCC’s proceedings, but more importantly, it pre-empts the state 
constitution in an attempt to justify its decision. Indeed, in reading 
Anderson, particularly in light of precedent and the constitutional text, 
Associate Chief Justice Durrant’s dissent is the only viable and 
appropriate understanding of the role of the supreme court in reviewing 
the JCC’s recommendations. Justice Durrant stated that the supreme 
court had no authority to remove judge Anderson “for conduct that was 
neither considered by the JCC nor a basis for the Commission’s 
recommended sanction.”122 Rather, any charge against a judge “must be 
addressed through the constitutionally-prescribed channel,”123 after 
which the supreme court can review the proceedings as set forth in the 
constitution.124
 
A.  Gathering Evidence: Appointing a Special Master 
 
By appointing a special master to conduct an in-depth and far-
reaching investigation into Judge Anderson’s case,125 the supreme court 
signaled that it was changing its methodology pertaining to its review of 
JCC proceedings and orders. Prior to Anderson, the court had refrained 
from engaging in any serious fact-finding in its review of JCC orders in 
judicial discipline cases.126 Precedent dictated that the court would be 
reluctant to engage in any further evidence collection, though it did 
reserve itself the right, as granted under the constitution,127 to do so if 
 122. Id. at 1154 (Durrant, J., dissenting). 
 123. Id. 
 124. UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 13. 
 125. See supra pp. 14-15; Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1138, 1141. The court’s action was a new 
approach to reviewing JCC recommendations that, while not making the referral improper, certainly 
makes a case for increased scrutiny. 
 126. See In re Young, 976 P.2d 581 (Utah 1999); In re McCully, 942 P.2d 327 (Utah 1997); In 
re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853 (Utah 1996). 
 127. UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 13. 
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necessary.128 Thus, historically, when faced with the need to gather 
significant additional evidence and findings, the court has said that it 
would likely remand to the JCC for further proceedings.129
Just ten years prior to Anderson, the supreme court stated, in 
reference to the deference granted to the JCC’s findings of fact, that 
“while the constitution does permit this court to take additional evidence, 
we have no ready mechanism for doing so.”130 The court continued, “We 
might choose to consider some additional uncontested evidence 
submitted by affidavit, but if there were a dispute as to proposed 
additional evidence, it is most likely that we would simply remand the 
matter to the Commission for further consideration of evidence and the 
entry of findings.”131 Accordingly, the Worthen court held that the 
“evidence is currently deficient”132 and without JCC findings and 
explanations to support the charges, the court could make no 
determination as to the nature of, or even if sanctions should be given.133
Accordingly, the Worthen court then remanded to the JCC, stating 
that the Commission may even need to start from scratch “in order to 
remedy the deficiencies” in the JCC’s “complaint and notice, in the 
evidence, and in the findings and conclusions.”134 Thus, when the JCC’s 
findings and evidence are particularly deficient, or there are other matters 
that the JCC needs to consider, the court has indicated it will remand the 
case back to the JCC rather than forge ahead by gathering its own 
evidence. 
In its order of referral to the special master in Anderson, the supreme 
court stated that it was “considering the imposition of sanctions different 
from, and potentially more serious than, those ordered by the Judicial 
Conduct Commission.”135 Although the Utah Constitution permits 
imposing more serious sanctions than recommended by the JCC,136 the 
 128. Worthen, 926 P.2d at 862 (“In conducting the factual review, this court is not limited to 
the evidence taken before the Commission but ‘may also permit the introduction of additional 
evidence’” (quoting UTAH CONST. art VIII, § 13)). 
 129. See Worthen, 926 P.2d at 874, 878. 
 130. Id. at 864. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 875. 
 133. Id. at 874. 
 134. Id. at 878. 
 135. Initial Brief of Utah Judicial Conduct Commission at Addendum 3, 1 part (C), In re 
Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2004) (No. 20030345-SC). 
 136. See UTAH CONST. art VIII, § 13. Judge Anderson raised the issue of the constitutionality 
of using a special master, but the court said, “we find no merit in Judge Anderson’s concern, and 
reject his challenge to our authority to appoint a special master as our agent to collect additional 
evidence.” In re Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134, 1148 (Utah 2004). The author feels that this rebuttal is 
valid because using a special master is not the problematic issue. Rather, the referred material is 
what was beyond the reach of the supreme court; One cannot give or refer authority that one never 
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Court then asks the special master to look into matters having nothing to 
do with the timeliness complaint lodged with the JCC.137 Such an 
expansion of the case, to including allegations not addressed to the JCC, 
is not constitutional. 
The court’s referral to the special master focuses on the federal suit 
Judge Anderson filed against the Attorney General and Guardian ad 
Litem’s offices, as well as Anderson’s actions subsequent to those 
addressed in the complaint.138 Anderson’s brief to the supreme court 
summarized this point: “In its Order of Referral the court delineated 
exactly what it wanted the Special Master to investigate in six separate 
paragraphs, all of which appear to be directed to issues about Judge 
Anderson’s relationship with litigants, colleagues, or his ability to 
perform his judicial duties.”139 It then concludes by stating that “[n]one 
of those paragraphs refers to the ‘proceedings’ before the JCC.”140 
Justice Durrant described this problem in his dissent, “I disagree . . . that 
this court is empowered to remove Judge Anderson from office for 
conduct that was neither considered by the JCC nor a basis for the 
Commission’s recommended sanction.”141 The “conduct” Justice Durrant 
is describing was the entire focus of the Special Master’s investigation.142
Thus, in asking the special master to conduct an in-depth 
examination of the six particular factors listed above,143 the supreme 
court breached the constitutionally- and statutorily-prescribed bounds for 
review of a JCC order. While the constitution does give the court power 
to gather “additional evidence” in its review capacity, this ability must be 
read in context to fully understand what is meant. The full text states: 
 
Prior to the implementation of any commission order, the Supreme 
Court shall review the commission’s proceedings as to both law and 
fact. The court may also permit the introduction of additional evidence. 
After its review, the Supreme Court shall, as it finds just and proper, 
issue its order implementing, rejecting, or modifying the commission’s 
order.144
 
had in the first place. 
 137. See Initial Brief of JCC at Addendum 3, 3 part (C), In re Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134 (Utah 
2004) (No. 20030345-SC). 
 138. See supra pp. 11-12; Brief of Appellant at 53, In re Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2004) 
(No. 20030345-SC) (citation omitted); Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1155-56 (Durrant, J., dissenting). 
 139. Brief of Appellant at 52, In re Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2004) (No. 20030345-SC). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1154 (Durrant, J., dissenting). 
 142. See supra pp. 14-15. 
 143. Id. 
 144. UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 13. 
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The sentence permitting additional evidence immediately follows the 
description of the court’s review function, thereby implying that the 
additional evidence should only pertain to those matters that were before 
the JCC.145 Additionally, the next sentence begins with “[a]fter its 
review,”146 implying that the additional evidence should pertain directly 
to reviewing the proceedings. Anderson’s brief also articulated this 
problem when it stated that 
 
[b]y its Order of Referral the Supreme Court has introduced a new 
procedure for investigating and sanctioning judges which is neither 
provided for by the constitution, which vests such authority in the JCC, 
nor by statute which limits the role of the Supreme Court to that of 
reviewing the proceedings of the JCC. The Utah Constitution restricts 
the supreme court to reviewing the “commission’s proceedings as to 
both law and fact.147
 
The issues referred to the special master were beyond the scope of the 
supreme court’s role as reviewer of the JCC proceedings. Thus, the 
supreme court has interpreted the language, “the court may also permit 
the introduction of additional evidence”148 so broadly as to destroy any 
real power of the JCC—a constitutionally created body. Precedent 
further strengthens this argument. 
In McCully, the court engaged in additional fact-finding, stating 
simply that it “considered additional evidence and heard oral argument 
from both parties pursuant to its authority under article VIII, section 13 
of the Utah Constitution.”149 Nevertheless, the court does not disclose 
what that “additional evidence” was and in the end concluded that “the 
Commission’s findings are well supported by the evidence we have 
reviewed on the record.”150 Accordingly, the court upheld the 
Commission’s recommendation, giving no real idea as to what role the 
additional evidence played in their ultimate determination151
Similarly the In re Young court looked at the findings, evidence, 
conclusions, and the considerations used by the JCC, and deemed the 
 
 145. See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-8-107(8)(i). “Before the implementation, rejection, or 
modification of any commission order. . .the supreme court shall. . .review the commission’s 
proceedings as to both law and fact and may permit the introduction of additional evidence.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 146. UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 13. 
 147. Id. at § 13(5) (emphasis added). 
 148. Id. at § 13. 
 149. In re McCully, 942 P.2d 327, 328 (Utah 1997). 
 150. Id. at 331. 
 151. See generally id. 
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recommended sanctions appropriate.152 The JCC investigated Judge 
Young after they received a complaint alleging he made a phone call on 
July 11, 1994, to a litigant regarding a case that was ongoing, but over 
which he was no longer presiding.153 Unfortunately for Judge Young, he 
was reassigned to the case and one of the litigants complained that the 
nature of the phone conversation impacted the ultimate settlement.154 The 
supreme court exercised proper restraint in this instance by limiting its 
review to the basis of the complaint filed with the JCC and the telephone 
conversation that took place on July 11, 1994.155 While the phone call 
was five years prior to the court’s review, the court did not appoint a 
special master to gather evidence concerning Judge Young’s conduct 
subsequent to the time of the phone call. Rather, they restricted 
themselves to a review of the JCC’s determination as to the complaint.156 
To do otherwise would not be a review, but an initial investigation into 
matters not pertaining to the JCC’s complaint. 
While McCully and Young demonstrate that some reliance on 
additional evidence is not improper, the Anderson court certainly 
engaged in a “rare move”157 by taking upon itself the role of intense 
investigator and evidence collector through the means of a special 
master.158 Had the special master been tasked with discovering 
“additional evidence” pertaining only to the facts of the eleven cases that 
were the subject of the JCC’s recommendation, the appointment of the 
special master would simply have been a novel approach to judicial 
discipline cases in Utah. Indeed, the court notes that “the appointment of 
a master is a traditional and time-honored mechanism” for collecting 
evidence.159 Instead, because the special master was tasked with 
gathering evidence pertaining to conduct not considered by the JCC,160 
 
 152. In re Young, 984 P.2d 997, 1009 (Utah 1999). 
 153. Id. at 999-1000. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See id. at 1000, 1004; see also id. at 1001 (stating “the appropriateness of the 
Commission’s recommended sanction turn in large measure on what Judge Young said or implied 
during that telephone call”). The court reviewed the JCC proceedings in a step-by-step fashion, 
beginning by looking at whether the JCC could have found that Judge Young was acting in his 
judicial capacity for the phone call. Id. at 1005. The court agreed with the JCC’s determination. Id. at 
1006. The court then analyzed the record and the evidence to determine whether the JCC’s 
determination that the phone call violated judicial conduct, was correct. Id. They also agreed with 
the JCC on this point. Id. The court did however disagree with and therefore did not implement the 
JCC’s findings as to Judge Young’s purported bias and failure to disqualify himself. Id. at 1006-07. 
 156. Id. at 1109-10. The court only used the evidence of the other phone call as a factor 
supporting the imposition of a sanction. 
 157. Elizabeth Neff, Complaints on Judge Reviewed, SALT LAKE TRIB., June 11, 2003, at A1. 
 158. In re Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134, 1138 (Utah 2004). 
 159. Id. at 1148. 
 160. See Initial Brief of Utah Judicial Conduct Commission at Addendum 3, 3 part (C), In re 
Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2004) (No. 20030345-SC). 
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the scope of the referral became inappropriate. The court’s reliance on 
the special master’s findings was likewise inappropriate. 
 
B.  Employing the Special Master’s Report 
 
The Anderson court explicitly recognized the role the special master, 
as well as the evidence he gathered pertaining to conduct not considered 
by the JCC, played in making its decision.161 The opinion reads, “We 
have carefully reviewed all of the materials submitted to us by the 
parties, as well as the record of proceedings before the special master, 
and the record of proceedings before the Judicial Conduct 
Commission.”162 Justice Durrant states the court’s inappropriate reliance 
quite plainly by explaining, “we remove Judge Anderson today for 
conduct that played no role in the Commission proceeding and that had 
no bearing upon the sanction recommended by the Commission.”163 In 
other words, the court removed Judge Anderson based upon the special 
master’s evidence—evidence that was beyond the scope of the court’s 
“review” capacity. 
Using the special master’s evidence pertaining to matters not dealt 
with by the JCC is particularly troubling given that the supreme court 
had previously struck down the JCC’s practice of initiating complaints of 
its own volition.164 Prior to Anderson, the JCC would often initiate its 
own complaints, either through staff or Commission members.165 This 
practice was permitted by the statutory definition of a complaint, which 
was an “allegation based on reliable information received in any form, 
from any source, that alleges, or from which a reasonable inference can 
be drawn that a judge is in violation of any provision of Utah 
Constitution article VIII, section 13.”166 In response to this practice the 
court held that the JCC cannot “initiate action against a judge or justice 
absent a complaint brought by someone else”167 because doing so 
“‘exceeds the Commission’s grant of authority by article VIII, section 13 
of the Utah Constitution.’”168 The court then added that the JCC only had 
authority over a complaint brought by an outside source; it could not 
 
 161. Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1138. 
 162. Id. (emphasis added). 
 163. Id. at 1154 (Durrant, J., dissenting). 
 164. Id. at 1147. 
 165. Id. 
 166. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-8-101(2) (2002). 
 167. Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1147. 
 168. Id. (quoting In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 877 (Utah 1996)). Judge Anderson’s brief had 
challenged the JCC’s practice of initiating its own complaints. Brief of Appellant at 36-37, In re 
Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2004) (No. 20030345-SC). This was one of the few areas in which 
Judge Anderson’s appeal was actually decided in his favor. 
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initiate a complaint of any sort on its own account.169
 
C.  Judicial Restraint Developed in Precedent 
 
Like its limitation prohibiting self initiated investigations by the 
JCC, supreme court precedent gives indication of similar restraints on the 
court itself, which is logical given that the constitution only grants the 
court the power to review the JCC’s proceedings.170 For example, when 
asked to use their “‘inherent powers’” to remove a judge from her 
position as a bar commissioner and president-to-be of the Utah State Bar, 
the supreme court said, 
 
We do not have any authority. . .to supervise the conduct of judges as a 
matter of initial investigation and review, that duty being delegated to a 
judicial conduct commission by section 13 of article VIII of our 
constitution. We are constitutionally obligated to review the 
commission’s proceedings, but we have no authority to undertake 
initial review of matters related to compliance with the judicial canon 
of ethics.171
 
The court, therefore, gave deference to the JCC as to supervision and 
initial investigation of matters concerning judges. Further precedent 
shows such deference in action. 
The Worthen court refused to adopt a de novo standard of review 
because they feared that doing so would demean the JCC’s role.172 
Instead, the court held that “[t]he standard of review we adopt should not 
make the Commission a mere factotum, lacking real power and without a 
significant role to play in the judicial discipline process”173 because 
“[t]here is nothing in the constitution that suggests the Commission is to 
function as a mere evidence collector for this court.”174 The court 
recognized the integral role of the JCC in the judicial discipline process 
and held that it would only overturn the Commission’s factual findings if 
those findings were “arbitrary, capricious, or plainly in error.”175 
 
 169. Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1147. The Utah Legislature subsequently amended the statute to 
comport with the court’s ruling. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-8-101(2) (2004). Indeed, as of May 
2004, the statute states that a “‘Complaint’ does not include an allegation initiated by the 
commission or its staff.” Id. 
 170. See UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 13. 
 171. In re Greenwood, 796 P.2d 682, 683 (Utah 1990) (emphasis in original). 
 172. Worthen, 926 P.2d at 853, 865. 
 173. Id. at 862-63. 
 174. Id. at 864. 
 175. Id. at 865. 
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Significantly, the Worthen court found the JCC record lacking the 
integral pieces needed to make a proper review of that body’s 
proceedings, so the court remanded the case back to the JCC for further 
investigation and rulings.176 Thus the court did not take matters into its 
own hands, implicitly recognizing that if it were to make such 
investigations and rulings, it would extend itself beyond a review of the 
JCC’s proceedings and violate the state’s constitution.177 Yet the court 
did just the opposite in Anderson.178
When rendering its conclusion, the court referenced the JCC’s 
findings, but then said, “[m]ore importantly, we also conclude, based 
upon the facts and evidence adduced by the proceedings before the 
special master, that the direct consequences of those violations also 
include the creation, by Judge Anderson, of circumstances which have” 
kept him from being able to do his job as a juvenile judge.179 Such 
conduct, therefore, “also constitutes conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice which brings a judicial office into disrepute.”180
Regardless of the potential truth of these statements, the court had no 
authority to “review” conduct that was never considered by the JCC. 
Justice Durrant stated that “[m]erely because a problem exists does not 
necessarily mean that [the supreme court is] empowered to remedy it.”181 
Accordingly, Anderson’s public accusations and his apparent inability to 
accept responsibility for many of his actions, should have been, at most, 
“aggravating or mitigating,”182 rather than determinative factors.183 By 
using the circumstances as determinative factors, however, the court 
bypassed “the constitutionally prescribed channel”184 of using the JCC as 
the initial step. This is certainly in opposition to Worthen’s precedent of 
not demeaning the JCC.185 Indeed, to call the court’s decision in 
Anderson a “review” of JCC proceedings as set forth in the Utah 
Constitution186is more than just a stretch. The complaint filed with the 
JCC and the JCC’s eventual order made no mention of Judge Anderson’s 
public accusations or any ongoing difficulties Judge Anderson had in 
performing his duties.187 Thus, in spite of its statements and actions in 
 
 176. Id. at 872. 
 177. See UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 13. 
 178. See In re Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1134, 1153 (Utah 2004). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 1155 (Durrant, J., dissenting). 
 182. Id. at 1154. 
 183. See id. at 1154-55. 
 184. Id. at 1155. 
 185. In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 865 (Utah 1996). 
 186. UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 13. 
 187. See Initial Brief of Utah Judicial Conduct Commission at Addendum 1, In re Anderson, 
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Greenwood,188 Worthen,189 and Young,190 the holding in Anderson 
ironically and inappropriately expanded its own power to permit the 
court to initiate its own complaints. In the words of Justice Durrant’s 
dissent, “[t]hus, we remove Judge Anderson today for conduct that 
played no role in the Commission proceedings” or “upon the sanction 
recommended by the Commission.”191
 
D.  The Utah Supreme Court’s Flawed Reasoning 
 
In attempting to justify its actions, the majority opinion points to the 
court’s superior position in the state.192 While stating that the JCC is 
“necessarily limited to the scope of complaints made against a judicial 
officer,”193 the court stated that it is not so limited because it selects the 
presiding judges and administrative officials in the state. The court also 
claims that because it is “the final arbiter of matters of judicial 
conduct”194 it is justified in its consideration of matters not dealt with by 
the JCC by calling them “essential to the resolution of the issue presented 
to the Judicial Conduct Commission.”195 Certainly the Worthen court 
could have made the same justification but chose instead to give the case 
back to the JCC for further determination.196
The court further reasons that this case is different from precedent, or 
that its situation is “unique”197 because it deals with “facts and evidence 
of ongoing difficulty.”198 While the court can consider “whether the 
judge has acknowledged or recognized that the acts occurred” and 
 
82 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2004) (No. 20030345-SC). 
 188. In re Greenwood, 796 P.2d 682, 683 (Utah 1990) (holding that the supreme court did 
“not have any authority . . . to supervise the conduct of judges as a matter of initial investigation and 
review, that duty being delegated to a judicial conduct commission by section 13 of article VIII of 
our constitution”). 
 189. Worthen, 926 P.2d at 862-63 (holding that “the purview of the Judicial Conduct 
Commission is necessarily limited to the scope of complaints made against a judicial officer”). 
 190. In re Young, 984 P.2d 997 (Utah 1999). 
 191. In re Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134, 1154 (Utah 2004); see also Daniel E. Witte, Bad 
Precedent: Inquiry Concerning a Judge Prompts an Inquiry About Civil Liberty and Judicial 
Independence, 2004 SUTHERLAND J. L & PUB. POL’Y L1, 2-3, available at 
http://www.sjlpp.org/documents/badprecedent.pdf. “Relying upon its own factual findings, rather 
than on the issues or facts taken on appeal from the Commission, the Court removed Judge 
Anderson from his office to punish him for filing a federal complaint containing negative statements 
about individuals in the Offices of the Guardian ad Litem and the Attorney General.” Id. 
 192. Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1139-40. 
 193. Id. at 1139. 
 194. Id. at 1140. 
 195. Id. 
 196. In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 872 (Utah 1996). 
 197. Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1138. 
 198. Id. at 1140. 
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“whether the judge has evidenced an effort to change or modify his . . . 
conduct,”199 here the court states that “in rare cases, the behavior for 
which the Judicial Conduct Commission recommends discipline is of an 
ongoing nature that itself requires correction.”200 This conclusion is 
flawed. The JCC only considered Judge Anderson’s conduct pertaining 
to timeliness in certain types of hearings.201 The JCC’s recommendation 
therefore did not deal with the federal suit or Judge Anderson’s 
disqualification from hearing cases with the Attorney General’s or 
Guardian ad Litem’s offices as parties. While Anderson admittedly 
remained obstinate about his faults pertaining to the timeliness charges 
before the JCC,202 his federal suit and disqualifications were not the 
behaviors dealt with by the JCC and such circumstances take Anderson’s 
case beyond “unique” and into an entirely new realm. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
Judge Anderson, whatever his faults and mistakes, deserved to have 
the process of judicial discipline, as set forth by the state constitution, run 
its proper course. The supreme court has power to review only the JCC 
proceedings once an outside party has filed a complaint with the JCC 
concerning a specific judge. While Anderson’s seemingly retaliatory 
conduct was likely inappropriate and stood in the way of him performing 
his role as a judge, and while Anderson may have even deserved to be 
removed from the bench, the supreme court’s actions were 
unconstitutional. 
This Note’s arguments would be moot had a number of things 
occurred: (1) Someone filed a complaint with the JCC concerning Judge 
Anderson’s federal suit, and his actions subsequent to the timeliness 
complaints considered by the JCC; (2) the JCC collected evidence, held 
hearings, and made a determination as to which of the five factors, as 
delineated in the constitution,203 Anderson’s conduct violated; (3) the 
 199. In re McCully, 942 P.2d 327, 331 (Utah 1997) (quoting In re Blauvelt, 801 P.2d 235, 240 
(Wash. 1990) (quoting In re Kaiser, 759 P.2d 392, 400 (Wash. 1988))). The rules put forward by the 
Washington State Supreme Court in Blauvelt were adopted as principles of review by the Utah 
Judicial Conduct Commission on February 7, 1996. Id. 
 200. Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1139-40. 
 201. See Initial Brief of Utah Judicial Conduct Commission at Addendum 2, 1, In re 
Anderson, 82 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2004) (No. 20030345-SC). 
 202. See Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1152-53. 
 203. The five factors are: “(1) action which constitutes willful misconduct in office; (2) final 
conviction of a crime punishable as a felony under state or federal law; (3) willful and persistent 
failure to perform judicial duties; (4) disability that seriously interferes with the performance of 
judicial duties; or (5) conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings a judicial 
office into disrepute.” UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 13(1)-(5). 
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JCC decided to order a certain sanction for the judge’s suit and actions 
subsequent to the timeliness complaints; (4) the supreme court reviewed 
the JCC’s proceedings and made a determination as to the 
appropriateness of the recommended sanction; (5) the supreme court felt 
that, in light of the evidence pertaining to the complaints filed before the 
JCC, removal was warranted; (6) the court ordered Judge Anderson’s 
removal. The supreme court also could have remanded back to the JCC, 
asking that someone file a complaint with that body pertaining to Judge 
Anderson’s federal suit and retaliatory actions. If a complaint is filed 
with the JCC, then the case can proceed through the above listed steps. 
The supreme court could have also removed the Court of Appeals’ 
ruling that Judge Anderson be disqualified from all cases in which the 
offices of the Guardian ad Litem or the Attorney General appeared and 
conditionally reinstated him—perhaps on a probationary status. This 
would not have been a severe departure from the JCC’s recommendation 
and would have been a feasible punishment given the conduct dealt with 
by the JCC. In addition, probation would have provided oversight of his 
actions and given him a chance to prove his ability to improve the 
situation under less adversarial circumstances. Under these terms, the 
court would consider only the conduct dealt with in the JCC’s 
proceedings, while still recognizing that there are “aggravating or 
mitigating”204 circumstances that currently exist that need to be 
scrutinized. Indeed, Anderson had requested that his federal suit be 
withdrawn,205 allowing probation to address the court’s remaining 
concern: any bias in Judge Anderson’s conduct while on the bench. If, 
while on probation, Anderson’s actions proved problematic or biased, 
someone—even a court—could file a complaint with the JCC and the 
judicial discipline process could follow its constitutionally prescribed 
course. 
These suggestions might be unrealistic, ineffective or an inefficient 
use of judicial resources, or mere formality. Indeed, a good case exists 
for Judge Anderson’s removal from the bench. However, when a 
constitution sets forth certain procedures, they should be strictly 
followed. Failure to do so by creating an ethereal standard based on a 
conglomeration of negative circumstances creates an unworkable 
standard. Where does the supreme court draw the line? What if Judge 
Anderson had only lost half of his caseload, would that have been 
enough? What if a judge gets sued by a party that deals with one-fourth 
 204. Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1154 (Durrant, J., dissenting). 
 205. Anderson filed a Motion to Dismiss with the Federal District Court on November 13, 
2003. Reply Brief of Honorable Joseph W. Anderson at Addendums 3-5, In re Anderson, 82 P.3d 
1134 (Utah 2004) (No. 20030345-SC). 
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of the judge’s caseload and the judge responds somewhat vehemently to 
the complaint? Will government agencies and their litigants face the 
same standard? One can only guess. 
Judge Anderson’s actions and decisions were indeed “tragic”206 and 
caused numerous complications throughout the three-and-a-half year 
disciplining process, but this did not excuse the court from initiating and 
investigating its own complaints against a judge. Much of the law and 
many of the cases decided in courts every day focus on formalities and 
subtleties. Indeed, for some, the difference between a life sentence and 
freedom can sometimes be determined by the most minor of procedural 
requirements. For Anderson, the court’s deviance from a constitutionally 
prescribed procedure cost him his livelihood. 
 
Daniel Swinton 
 206. Anderson, 82 P.3d at 1137. 
